A new dawn for (oil) incumbents within the bioeconomy? Trade-offs and lessons for policy by Hellsmark, Hans & Hansen, Teis
A new dawn for (oil) incumbents within the bioeconomy? Trade-offs
and lessons for policy
Downloaded from: https://research.chalmers.se, 2021-08-31 16:55 UTC
Citation for the original published paper (version of record):
Hellsmark, H., Hansen, T. (2020)
A new dawn for (oil) incumbents within the bioeconomy? Trade-offs and lessons for policy
Energy Policy, 145
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111763
N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.
research.chalmers.se offers the possibility of retrieving research publications produced at Chalmers University of Technology.
It covers all kind of research output: articles, dissertations, conference papers, reports etc. since 2004.
research.chalmers.se is administrated and maintained by Chalmers Library
(article starts on next page)
Energy Policy 145 (2020) 111763
Available online 3 August 2020
0301-4215/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
A new dawn for (oil) incumbents within the bioeconomy? Trade-offs and 
lessons for policy 
Hans Hellsmark a,*, Teis Hansen b,c 
a Department of Technology Management and Economics, Chalmers University of Technology, SE-412 96, Göteborg, Sweden 
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A B S T R A C T   
This paper develops a more detailed understanding of when incumbent actors may become the main locomotive 
driving energy transitions. It also illustrates the trade-offs between policy approaches that actively seek to 
involve the incumbents in transitions, and policy approaches that pursue transitions without their active 
involvement. The paper examines state support for the bioeconomy in Sweden and concludes that public in-
vestments have been geared towards large-scale, complex and integrated biorefineries that are dependent on the 
active participation of the forest industry. Incumbents in the forest industry have, however, both lacked moti-
vation and the abilities required to take the necessary steps for commercialisation of the demonstrated concepts. 
Instead, a rather small investment in a joint venture between actors from the forestry and oil refinery industry in 
Sweden has spurred learning and revenues; and it has placed an oil refinery at the centre of the future devel-
opment of what we here term distributed biorefining. The main trade-off is that while this shift has opened up for 
cross-industrial collaborations and the production of advanced biofuels and materials, it has also paved the way 
for further investments in existing fossil-fuel infrastructure.   
1. Introduction 
Almost 20 years ago, in a seminal paper in Energy Policy, Unruh 
(2000) elaborated on the underlying causes of what was termed the 
“carbon lock-in” and explained why the shift to renewable and sus-
tainable energy systems is so inherently difficult. Essentially, energy 
transitions are hampered by multiple lock-in mechanisms that prevent 
destabilisation of the carbon-intensive energy system (Klitkou et al., 
2015). Although progress has been made, the carbon lock-in still holds 
most major economies in as tight a grip as ever, and in spite of significant 
investments in renewable energy the overall fossil dependency has not 
been significantly reduced. A central lock-in mechanism holding back 
the energy transition is the prior investments of firms, industries and 
countries in production equipment, distribution facilities and knowl-
edge, which leads to increasing returns from learning and additional 
build-up in relation to existing systems of production and consumption 
(Arthur, 1990; Hughes, 1987; Klitkou et al., 2015). 
The strategic approach taken by many countries to breaking the 
existing lock-in has been to stimulate the growth of new and renewable 
alternatives outside the control of existing and dominating actors, 
termed incumbents, in important and often mature industrial sectors. 
Less attention has been given to an alternative approach, namely to 
depart from the existing and mature industry to develop more sustain-
able alternatives that can be integrated into existing operations and 
thereby accomplish a transition from within (Geels and Schot, 2007; 
Smith et al., 2005). 
However, also in the case of energy, it can be hypothesized that 
incumbent actors may drive the transition processes, and research in-
terests in the role of incumbents for energy transitions has been growing 
(e.g., Kungl and Geels (2018); Stirling (2019); van Mossel et al. (2018)). 
In a viewpoint article, Turnheim and Sovacool (2019; p.4) suggest that 
“[t]he role of incumbencies in transitions is a vibrant and promising 
avenue for research” which requires further attention to the question of 
when incumbents may be a progressive force in transition processes. 
Consequently, the aim of the current paper is two-fold. Firstly, we aim to 
arrive at a more detailed understanding of when incumbents may drive 
energy transitions, thereby extending existing research that has a “ten-
dency to portray incumbents as ‘villains’ wedded to resisting, slowing 
down or preventing transition efforts” (Turnheim and Sovacool, 2019, 
p.1). We argue that this requires specific attention to the motivation and 
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ability of incumbents to engage in transition processes. Secondly, we 
aim to illustrate the policy-related trade-offs between policy approaches 
that actively seek to involve incumbents in energy transitions and policy 
approaches that try to pursue such transitions without their active 
involvement. Previous research on incumbents has failed to consider 
how such policy-related trade-offs arise, depending on the actors that 
take the lead and set the agenda in transition processes. 
Empirically, we study the transition towards biorefineries in Sweden 
with an emphasis on the role of incumbents from three key and mature 
industries: oil refining, forestry and energy. This makes an interesting 
case, since the loosely defined concepts of biorefineries constitute a set 
of technologies that can be integrated into various industries for the 
production of biofuels, in combination with other products such as heat, 
electricity, chemicals and materials. Sweden is also a country that has 
invested heavily in technology development of biorefinery technologies 
for a long time and where incumbent actors from these industries have 
played a dominant role in this development. 
2. Conceptual background 
Our theoretical point of departure is previous research on firms in 
mature industries and how they influence a potential transition to a 
more sustainable society. Traditionally, research on incumbents, un-
derstood as firms possessing power, resources and a large market share 
due to their presence in industries over a long duration has departed 
from the notion that firms in mature industries are unwilling to make 
major changes (Dosi, 1984; Nelson and Winter 1982). Accordingly, the 
rate of product innovation is low in these industries and the focus is 
rather on incremental process innovations intended to increase pro-
ductivity and profitability rather than exploration and the development 
of new innovations (March, 1999). As argued by Dosi (1984), such 
incumbent actors tend to be locked into current technologies, products 
and markets because of their shared cognitive beliefs or paradigms. 
The sustainability transitions literature has expanded and elaborated 
on this traditional view on incumbents. In particular, a number of 
contributions highlight how incumbent actors in mature industries react 
to the emergence of greener, potentially disruptive innovations that are 
based on different knowledge bases and require a different institutional 
set-up (van Mossel et al., 2018). Essentially, most attention has been 
given to the strategies employed by incumbents to prevent or slow 
transitions, both through individual actions and through networks 
spanning across sectors and the state (Newell and Johnstone, 2018). 
Incumbent actors often establish coalitions with policymakers and ex-
ercise a range of different forms of power in order to maintain market 
shares. For example, Geels (2014) as well as Kungl and Geels (2018) 
highlight how incumbents from the electricity sector use instrumental, 
discursive, material and institutional forms of power to resist climate 
change legislation, which may be a particularly successful approach 
when incumbents are facing single (rather than multiple) external 
pressures. Smink et al. (2015) similarly show how incumbents in the 
Dutch petroleum and lighting industries protect their financial interests 
through influencing policymakers and engaging in strategic 
standard-setting. Trencher et al. (2019) describe the multiple narratives 
used by Japanese incumbents to protect and promote investments in 
coal power plants, and Lee and Hess (2019) demonstrate how the in-
tensity of resistance by incumbents is related to the strength of the threat 
posed by emerging technologies. 
In addition to contributions highlighting how incumbents strategi-
cally seek to slow transitions to protect financial interests, research also 
underlines that many incumbents have insufficient capabilities to drive 
transitions. To exemplify, Wesseling et al. (2017) highlight that the 
decarbonisation potential of incumbents in energy-intensive processing 
industries is limited due to specialisation in incremental process in-
novations. Similarly, Dewald and Achternbosch’s (2016) analysis of 
incumbents in the cement industry uncovers that they have limited in-
ternal capacity to carry out radical innovation projects and find it 
difficult to attract the required human capital. Bauer et al. (2018) also 
show that incumbents prefer intra-rather than inter-sectoral collabora-
tions in innovation projects, which limits the scope for radical 
innovation. 
Synthesizing these insights, we follow Hansen and Coenen (2017), 
who suggest that incumbents may both have limited motivation and 
ability to drive disruptive innovation. The lack of motivation relates to 
the low propensity of incumbents to prioritise resources for disruptive 
innovation. This follows from the reliance on established technologies to 
generate profit, which disincentivizes incumbents from developing and 
diffusing new competing technologies. Investments are instead steered 
towards deepening specialisation in current profit-generating activities. 
The lack of ability refers to the limited ability of incumbents to develop 
and compete in disruptive technologies. This results from the existence 
of organisational routines in incumbents, which are formed by the 
existing production system. While this allows incumbents to innovate 
efficiently when it comes to incremental improvements of existing 
products and processes, it may also result in myopia and limit the ability 
to develop radical innovations. Specifically regarding transition pro-
cesses towards a bioeconomy, incumbents have also been found to react 
with great caution and resistance towards future opportunities (Bauer 
et al., 2017; Hansen and Coenen, 2017; Karltorp and Sandén, 2012; 
Näyhä and Pesonen, 2014). 
At the same time, other recent contributions illustrate how in-
cumbents may overcome this lack of motivation and ability, and a more 
balanced view on incumbency has received some traction (Turnheim 
and Sovacool, 2019). More recently, several articles have highlighted 
how the strategic actions of incumbents have played a key role in 
creating opportunities for the development of radical and more sus-
tainable innovations. For example, Hanson (2018) illustrates how the 
established electrometallurgical industry has provided a foundation for 
building a photovoltaic technological innovation system (TIS) in Nor-
way, and Haley (2015, 2014) reports how structural overlaps between 
the established hydropower regime and electric vehicle TIS in Quebec 
have supported the growth of the latter, for example through legitimacy 
benefits and knowledge development. Under some circumstances, in-
cumbents may support the development of innovations with a potential 
to cannibalize on their existing markets, even if their engagement is then 
likely to be more volatile and vulnerable to external changes (see for 
example the case of off-shore wind in Norway, Mäkitie et al., 2018; 
Normann, 2015; Steen and Weaver, 2017). 
Finally, other studies describe how incumbents may pursue con-
trasting technology strategies and are able to manage multi-technology 
paths (Berggren et al., 2015; Onufrey and Bergek, 2019, 2015). 
Reflecting this, incumbents have also been found to exercise dual stra-
tegies, where they marginalize and hinder the development of emerging 
niches, while at the same time actively investing in these same niche 
technologies (Hess, 2013; Smink et al., 2015). Importantly, incumbent 
involvement in emerging niches is likely to considerably change the 
niche, as exemplified by organic food, which initially challenged the 
industrial food production system, but eventually became a variant 
within it, as the incumbent food production industry became increas-
ingly involved (Hess, 2007). 
While research highlights that incumbents may promote transition 
processes, the sustainability transitions literature has in particular 
highlighted the possibilities and strategies employed by incumbents 
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with the aim of hindering transitions (Turnheim and Sovacool, 2019). 
This is mirrored in research on transformative innovation policy, which 
emphasizes the importance of destabilizing incumbent systems, 
including limiting the ability of incumbents to exercise power, or 
completely replacing incumbent actors with new entrants (Kivimaa and 
Kern, 2016; Turnheim and Geels, 2012). While it is acknowledged that 
this may also incentivize some incumbents to take a progressive 
approach to transition processes (Kivimaa and Kern, 2016), and that 
transformative policy mixes may also include policy instruments focused 
on re-orientating incumbents (Grillitsch et al., 2019; Grillitsch and 
Hansen, 2019), the dominant focus in studies of “phase-out” (Rogge and 
Johnstone, 2017) or “exnovation” (David, 2017) policy is on over-
coming the resistance of incumbents. 
However, the role of incumbents in transitions is influenced by their 
motivation and ability to drive radical innovation (Hansen and Coenen, 
2017), which in turn is dependent on the characteristics of incumbents 
and potential transition processes. More specifically, incumbents’ moti-
vation may be higher if a transition opens opportunities for entering new 
markets (contrary to cannibalizing existing markets) or for invigorating 
existing markets, for example under pressure from consumers or regu-
lators (contrary to non-contested markets). The ability of the incumbents 
will likely be higher if existing market knowledge and technical com-
petences can be utilized in the transition process (contrary to transitions 
requiring new competences). Importantly, we would also expect that 
only incumbents possessing both a high motivation and a high ability 
will indeed drive transitions – having just one of the two will likely be 
insufficient. As an example, we analyse the motivation and ability of 
incumbents to drive the transition towards biorefineries in Sweden in 
Section 4, and discuss policymaking in light of the findings in Section 5. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Case description 
The development of future biorefineries constitutes a subset of 
various different technological options that draw on both combustion 
technology, gasification, biochemical conversion etc. Technologies that 
enable future biorefineries can also be integrated into various infra-
structural settings, such as in district heating, pulp and paper (P&P) 
production, sawmills, crop-based fuel production, production of basic 
chemicals, oil refineries etc. The potential products that could be pro-
duced include renewable heat, electricity, transportation fuels, chem-
icals, new materials, feed and food stuff, depending on the raw materials 
and industry integration. The technology development is therefore 
positioned at the intersection between several mature industries, such as 
the forest industry, the chemical industry, agriculture, energy and oil 
refining, with associated dominating incumbent actors. Thus, actors 
attempting to develop the technology have to access key competences 
from different industrial sectors, which in some cases have had little 
previous contact, and integrate the technology into the existing opera-
tions of incumbent actors (Bauer et al., 2018; Hellsmark et al., 2016b). 
Incumbent actors, their motivation and abilities, will therefore have 
a significant influence on how the technology develops and which 
products will be produced, since not all options will be equally inter-
esting for all industries. We therefore argue that the biorefinery case is a 
suitable case for comparing the motivation and abilities of incumbents 
moving into the field from different industries, as well as for illustrating 
policy related trade-offs that depend on which actors take the lead in the 
development. 
Sweden is also a suitable setting, since the development of various 
technology options have been ongoing since the early 1970s, engaging 
all of the above industries in experiments with different biorefinery 
technologies (Hellsmark et al., 2016b). We limit the analysis to the main 
actors moving in from the forest industry, oil refinery and energy areas 
(utilities and district heating) since their involvement has been most 
pronounced, although actors from transport, the chemical and 
agricultural industries have also been involved in activities during some 
periods. 
We also limit our study to the development of forest-based bio-
refineries, as this has been the most prominent development in Sweden. 
By focusing on forest-based biorefineries, we are able to include cases 
that cover all four main development trajectories present in the Swedish 
development (see Table 1). However, different from the other industries, 
energy utilities have only had an important role in three out of the five 
cases. They are still included in the analysis since they have been an 
important part of the development and represent an industry where 
biorefinery technologies could be integrated also in the future. 
3.2. Five cases: two types of value chains 
In this paper we focus on the main biorefinery experiments that have 
concerned incumbent actors since 2004. These experiments constitute 
our five cases, and also represent the main investments in Sweden for 
developing forest-based biorefineries and the development of forest- 
based biofuels, see Table 1 for an overview.1 
We divided these five cases into two different “types” of biorefinery 
experiments. These types are based on how the production of forest- 
based transportation fuels is organised. The first type we call “large- 
scale biorefineries” that integrate all production steps into one inte-
grated production facility, and constitute three main cases (Chemrec, 
SEKAB, Gobigas). These large-scale biorefinery experiments have only 
been loosely connected to each other and the lessons learned between 
these has therefore been very limited. The second type of biorefinery 
experiments are called “distributed biorefineries” in which an interme-
diary product is produced at one site and upgraded to a final product at 
another. This type is represented by two main cases (Sunpine, Preem). 
These two cases are quite closely related, and the first case (Sunpine) 
generated significant lessons for the second case (Preem) to learn from. 
These differences in learning between the two types of cases are also 
reflected in how the cases are presented in Section 4, where the learning 
between Sunpine and Preem is emphasised. 
3.3. Data collection and analysis 
For this study, we relied on process research (Langley et al., 2013) 
and qualitative data analysis (Gehman et al., 2018) to develop in-depth 
and historically rich case studies of the motivation and ability towards 
the development of biorefineries. In total, 44 formal interviews have 
been conducted over a period of 10 years (see the Appendix for a full 
list). The authors have followed biorefinery development in Sweden for 
more than a decade and have acquired deep insights through formal and 
informal contacts with the companies, research institutes and funding 
agents of past and current developments in the field. Formal interviews 
have, thus, also been supplemented with notes and insights from 
informal discussions with relevant actors at industry conferences, policy 
workshops etc. This has also contributed to allow the authors to un-
derstand the motivation and abilities of the incumbent actors to 
participate in the development of biorefineries. 
To develop the case studies, the complete story of the development 
was mapped and a timeline for each experiment was re-constructed, 
enabling the incumbents’ motivation and ability to be analysed based 
on secondary information and interviews. We ordered the data from the 
various sources chronologically for each of the analysed cases. The data 
analysis occurred iteratively as we went back and forth between the 
theoretical concepts and the data multiple times to identify the core 
conclusions emerging from the data. As our interpretations emerged, we 
verified the consistency of the account by iterating again and collecting 
additional secondary data (Gehman et al., 2018; Semper, 2019). 
1 Small-scale university experiments are excluded from the study, as well as 
experiments that do not focus on forest resources. 
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4. Findings 
4.1. Sweden’s position on a forest-based bioeconomy 
To a large extent, Sweden can be described as a forest nation. About 
two-thirds of the area of Sweden is covered with forest, out of which 80 
percent is cultivated. Approximately one percent of the cultivated forest 
is felled annually and over the past 90 years Sweden’s forest resources 
have doubled. Approximately 80 percent of the forest products are 
exported, at a total value of approximately EUR 10–15 billion per year, 
and the industry has 70,000 people in direct employment (Swedish 
Forest Industries Federation, 2018). Residues such as tops, branches and 
bark have also formed the basis for a rapid expansion of heat and power 
production, benefitting a wide range of industrial purposes and this 
continues to be the basis for an expansion of a bioeconomy where 
forest-based products and services are developed and commercialized. 
Given the past success of the Swedish forest industry in abating 
climate change and stimulating economic growth, it has been cited as 
one of the core pillars for delivering ambitious climate targets (Formas, 
2012). The forest industry is therefore envisioned to continue to play a 
central role in achieving national climate ambitions and also in deliv-
ering on the targets formulated in a new climate law (Miljö- och ener-
gidepartementet, 2017a; Skogsindustrierna, 2018). The law, which has 
been in effect since June 2018, stipulates that:  
A. Sweden will not have any net greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, and 
thereafter will contribute negative net greenhouse gas emissions.  
B. Emissions from the transport sector will decrease by 70% by 2030. 
It has been argued that reaching these targets provides new and 
significant opportunities in the form of jobs, better health and increased 
competitiveness (Department of Environment, 2017; Fossil Free Swe-
den, 2020; Löfven, 2015).2 Swedish forest resources have also long been 
identified as key for delivering climate friendly transportation fuels 
needed for reducing emissions from the transport sector, Goal B, 
(Johansson, 2013). As such, the cases included in this study constitute 
the main public and private investments for developing domestic forest 
resources for biofuel production (Hellsmark et al., 2016b). 
However, reaching ambitious targets based on Swedish forest re-
sources is not without its challenges. For example, in the transport sector 
the use of biofuels has increased rapidly. As of 2017, approximately 20% 
of all fuels in the transportation sector are biofuels (Swedish Energy 
Agency, 2018). In spite of ambitious plans and significant support for 
building local value chains, only 15% of the total biofuels used are 
produced in Sweden and as little as 3% originate from the forest (see 
Fig. 1 for an overview of the main production facilities for biofuels in 
Sweden). 
In the following sections we analyse the motivation and abilities of 
the forest, oil refinery and energy industries when attempts have been 
made to commercialise forest-based biorefineries with the purpose of 
producing transportation fuels in combination with other products in a 
biorefinery setting. 
4.2. The motivation and ability of incumbents concerning large-scale 
biorefineries 
Since the mid-2000s, three main industrial scale demonstration fa-
cilities have received substantial government funding for demonstrating 
new value chains from the forest (Energimyndigheten, 2014), (see Fig. 2 
for an overview). 
These three pilot and demonstration projects have been at the core of 
developments in new biorefinery concepts and forest-based value chains 
for the transport sector, receiving direct governmental funding for 
construction and associated research in the range of EUR 20–100 million 
each. The three cases are similar in that they have:  
A. focused on taking forest-based biomass into a ready-made fuel that 
can be used for the transport sector;  
B. successfully managed to technically demonstrate their respective 
value chain;  
C. required significant up-front capital investments (in the range of EUR 
200–400 million), for taking the next step in development by in-
dustrial actors that could integrate the technology into their opera-
tions or build standalone plants;  
D. not been competitive with regards to their production costs 
compared to fossil fuels or 1st-generation biofuels under existing 
policy frameworks;  
E. been associated with significant political risks, thereby considerably 
reducing the attractiveness of this type of investment by industry. 
4.2.1. Case 1: Chemrec (2004–2018) 
The motivation of the forest industry has varied significantly over 
time concerning black liquor gasification (BLG). When the small tech-
nology company Chemrec started out developing the technology for BLG 
during the mid-1980s, the motivation of the forest industry was high, 
with a focus on replacing existing recovery boilers with the new and 
potentially more effective technology. This had all changed by the time 
this story starts in 2004. By then, conventional recovery boilers had 
increased in performance and to replace them with a technology that 
had not been commercially proven and was supplied by a small firm 
with no backing from existing large-scale technology suppliers in the 
industry was thus considered a big risk. As a response to an increasing 
focus on climate change, the focus of Chemrec shifted to renewable fuel 
production based on their BLG-technology. The development was sup-
ported by the Swedish Energy Agency, who established a major research 
program, the BLG-Program I&II that spanned more than a decade. The 
program included several of the major universities and research in-
stitutes in Sweden and was combined with direct investment support for 
constructing a new pilot and demonstration facility (Hellsmark et al., 
2016a). 
Table 1 
Overview of the five cases included in the study.  
Types of 
biorefineries 





2004–2018 Black liquor gasification Pressurized black liquor gasification for the production of DME/Methanol. 
Case 2: SEKAB 2004–2018 Biochemical conversion Biochemical conversion of cellulosic biomass to ethanol. 
Case 3: Gobigas 2014–2018 Gasification of solid 
biomass 
Large scale indirect atmospheric gasification of forest residues for the production of 
methane. 
Type 2: Distributed Case 4: Sunpine 2006–2018 Hydroprocessing of biooils Distillation of tall oil in combination with hydro processing into hydrogenated vegetable oil 
(HVO). 
Case 5: Preem 2015–2018 Hydroprocessing of biooils Pyrolysis and lignin filtration in combination with hydro processing into HVO.  
2 The forest industry and district heating sector play a key role in delivering 
towards Goal A, with significant biogenic CO2 emissions and the possibility of 
Biomass CCS (BECCS) (Karlsson, 2020). 
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The forest industry viewed the change in direction as potentially 
interesting, and one of the dominating firms in the industry allowed 
Chemrec to set up their testing facility in connection to their mill in Piteå 
(Table 2), but outside their core business. The forest industry adopted a 
“wait and see” strategy. However, with additional backing from the 
Swedish Energy Agency and the EU’s 7th framework program, Chemrec 
managed to set up a consortium of companies that could demonstrate 
the entire value chain from black liquor to DME production, as well as a 
small test fleet of DME-trucks supplied from Volvo that could run on the 
new fuel. In combination with the industrial consortium, public policy, 
mainly through R&D and investment funding, was thus instrumental in 
taking the technology as far as fleet trials. 
The oil industry was part of the consortium and supported the 
development (Preem and Total), as they were interested in developing 
the distribution system for the new fuel (DME) being developed. 
However, since the fuel could not be blended or integrated into their 
current business, they did not take a lead role in the development. 
After successful demonstration, a privately-owned pulp mill in 
Örnsköldsvik decided that they wanted to invest in a full-scale plant. 
The mill already produced some ethanol for the fuel market, in com-
bination with a larger variety of other and non-conventional forestry 
products, which made it quite different from most actors in the forest 
industry. 
Initial calculations indicated that profitability could be achieved 
under the existing support schemes (RENEW, 2008), which at the time 
consisted of an investment grant from the government covering 
approximately 10–20% of the total investment costs. Besides this grant 
and a general exemption from CO2-taxes, there were no specific 
market-based instruments which supported the scale-up. However, the 
plans were abandoned as the mill was sold to the Indian multi-national 
Aditya Birla. Aditya Birla had no previous experience in the fuel market 
and had little confidence that the temporary exemption from the 
Swedish CO2-tax (on which the entire profitability was based) consti-
tuted a stable framework for an investment with a payback time of 
10–15 years. The stability of the framework had not been a major issue 
for the previous investors, who had more trust in the Swedish gov-
ernment and had not pushed for a different type of framework. As a 
result, after Aditya withdrew from the project, the interest from the 
forest industry reached an all-time low and, without any financial 
backing from private investor, Chemrec was forced to file for 
bankruptcy. 
In the absence of Chemrec, but to keep the demonstration activities 
running, the Luleå University of Technology (LTU) took over the 
demonstration facilities and tried to re-brand the facility under the name 
LTU-Green Fuels, to serve a wider customer base. However, the re- 
branding of the facility into LTU-Green Fuels has been problematic 
and the interest of the forest industry for the technology has continued 
to be low. As a result, LTU mothballed the plant due to lack of funding 
and industrial interest in 2018. 
During this entire period, the ability of the forest industry was high in 
terms of integration of the technology in the P&P infrastructure, 
including exchange of heat and electricity, as well as assessment of risks 
associated with replacing the existing recovery boiler with a novel 
technology. However, most actors within the forest industry lacked the 
necessary knowledge of the advanced chemistry and knowledge about 
markets for new fuels. The only exception may have been the privately 
owned Domsjö mill, which had experience with producing ethanol for 
the chemical industry. None of the incumbent forestry actors had 
experience with the advanced chemistry of fuel production from syngas, 
which was at the core of the development. The oil industry, on the other 
hand, had complementary abilities concerning fuel standards and dis-
tribution that would have been useful in constructing a new infra-
structure for DME. 
None of the incumbent actors had significant motivation and abilities 
to really question the Swedish exemption from the CO2-tax or to make 
efforts to suggest a more stable alternative. Chemrec potentially could 
have seen the problem, but may have recognized it too late and did not 
have the resources and ability to lobby for a change. 
4.2.2. Case 2: SEKAB (2004–2018) 
The company SEKAB was formed as a joint venture between the 
companies MoDo (forest industry) and Berol Kemi (chemical industry) 
in 1985. MoDo owned and operated the Domsjö sulphite paper mill at 
the time, which produced ethanol as a by-product. SEKAB could be 
formed as it was supported by policy through a long-term procurement 
contract from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency3 for increasing 
the security of supply of chemicals in Sweden. 
The SEKAB joint venture was thus created to deal with a by-product 
and was not considered to be a core-business for MoDo or Berol Kemi. 
However, the ambitions of SEKAB grew to produce forest-based ethanol 
for the transportation sector. When this story starts, in 2004, a large- 
scale pilot facility was constructed with financing from the Swedish 
Energy Agency. The policy support consisted of investment support for 
the plant but also in long term and significant R&D program focusing on 
cellulosic ethanol, which involved the major universities in Sweden 
(Ulmanen, 2013). 
In 2005, a regional consortium consisting of a mix of actors acquired 
SEKAB from the forest industry (Ulmanen, 2013). This consortium 
included municipally owned energy utility companies and other 
regional actors. These actors entered from a regional development 
Fig. 1. Main production facilities for biofuels in Sweden (biogas not shown).  
Fig. 2. Main development efforts to create large scale biorefineries from forest 
resources over the period 1990–2018. 
3 “Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap” was called “Överstyrelsen 
för civil beredskap” in 1985. 
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perspective, considering the possibility of building 10–20 bioethanol 
plants in the sparsely populated northern Sweden, and were thus 
motivated by the possibility of creating new job opportunities in a po-
tential growth industry (Table 3). The plans were followed up by policies 
aiming for a large expansion of ethanol, supporting fleet trials and 
support to introduce flex-fuel vehicles etc. (see for example Holmgren 
(2012) and Hansson et al. (2018) for an overview). 
However, no investments were made by either the forest industry or 
the energy utilities after the technology had been developed. The lack of 
motivation resulted from the fact that neither of the industries who 
entered SEKAB considered it their core business strategy to build this 
type of plant. The oil industry also remained passive in relation to the 
projects, but had an interest in acquiring the fuel for blending in gaso-
line. In addition, with record high oil prices leading up to the financial 
crisis in 2008/2009, SEKAB and the main actors behind the company 
were not actively mobilizing support for changing the existing policy 
framework with the temporary exemption from the CO2-tax. 
SEKAB was heavily affected by the financial crisis and reached near 
bankruptcy in the period 2009–2012. In order to increase the focus on 
commercialisation of the technology and reduce the financial stress, 
SEKAB handed over the management of the research facility to the 
research institute RISE.4 
Not only the motivation, but also the ability of the oil, forest and 
energy industry in developing the “SEKAB”-technology must be 
considered as quite low. The oil refineries were unable to integrate the 
technology with existing operations and could at best hope to participate 
as a potential fuel supplier or investor. The P&P and energy industry 
lacked knowledge of fuel markets and the technology needed for inte-
grating with existing operations. They were also only observing the 
development in the light of a potential investment. Hence, similarly to 
Chemrec, SEKAB had no real backing from the incumbent actors to 
lobby for an alternative or updated market scheme when it became 
obvious that the exemption from the CO2-tax was not enough when the 
oil price dropped. 
4.2.3. Case 3: Gobigas (2014–2018) 
The motivation for building the Gobigas plant came from the local 
utility Göteborg Energy. They had received permission from the gov-
ernment to invest in a 600MW natural gas combined cycle plant under 
the condition that they also made efforts towards developing the biogas 
market and not only relied on natural gas. Göteborg Energy had a strong 
interest in developing the gas market and one can argue that developing 
the biogas market brought political legitimacy to their natural gas 
business, thus investing in biogas could be used as an argument for 
expanding the use and distribution of natural gas in Sweden (Table 4). 
However, producing ordinary biogas from fermentation was considered 
a small-scale business that could not supply sufficient volumes and 
profitability. Göteborg Energy therefore decided to turn towards the 
opportunity to produce synthetic natural gas from large-scale gasifica-
tion of solid biomass (Bio-SNG). The technology had been under 
development in Sweden during the 1990s and had been demonstrated 
for electricity production in Austria (Hellsmark, 2010). 
Producing bio-SNG involved major technical challenges and a com-
mercial scale plant could not be built without first demonstrating the 
technology. A procurement process was initiated for finding possible 
suppliers for a constructing a 100MW commercial-scale plant. Due to 
low technical maturity, Göteborg Energy had significant problems in 
finding a supplier and they were more or less forced to reformulate the 
project as a demonstration project. The new goal was to first construct a 
20MW demonstration plant and then connect the demonstration unit 
with a 80MW commercial unit, which in combination could operate 
under commercial conditions. An alliance was formed to develop the 
technology, consisting of the small engineering firm Repotec, with 
experience from the Austrian plants, the technology supplier Valmet, 
Haldor Topsoe for methane catalyses and Jacobs as the EPC-contractor. 
Chalmers University of Technology was instrumental in setting up the 
alliance as well as a smaller, 8MW pilot facility for initial testing of the 
technology. Göteborg Energy and the Swedish Energy Agency financed 
the construction of the pilot and demonstration facilities as well as the 
associated research needed for demonstrating large-scale production of 
bio-SNG. When the project was initiated, no additional market support 
beyond the temporary exemption from the CO2-tax was sought by the 
alliance, as the price of natural gas just before the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis was at a record high and was expected to continue increase. Initial 
calculations had illustrated profitability of a 100MW unit given 
continued high natural gas prices, the exemption from CO2-tax, invest-
ment support and the assumption that the market for gas fuelled vehicles 
could be further developed. 
Before the construction commenced, the financial crises became a 
reality. However, the initial project had already been financed and the 
construction of the 20MW demonstration unit continued and was taken 
into operation during 2014. The plant was also operated by Göteborg 
Energy until April 2018 (Youcefi, 2018). Given the radically changed 
market conditions and the fact that the plant had become a political 
liability within the local municipality, the demonstration plant was 
mothballed in 2018 and the future plans for a scale-up were abandoned. 
The oil and forest industries had not been involved in the project, 
apart from observing it from the far distance. The oil industry could see 
virtues with it, since they could have used the bio-SNG in the production 
of green hydrogen, thereby increasing the renewable content of their 
HVO. However, due to the high operating cost of the plant, it was not 
considered a commercially viable option. The forest industry was not 
Table 2 
Motivation and abilities of the oil, forest and energy industries in developing the 
“Chemrec”-technology for DME.   
Oil refinery industry Forest industry Energy 
industry 
Motivation  • Low: Interested in 
distributing the new 
fuel being developed 
but the fuel could not be 
blended or integrated 
into their current 
business and was 
therefore not at the 
core.  
• Low: Lack of 
confidence in the long- 






Ability  • High: Competencies in 
fuel distribution and 
markets.  
• Low: Lack of 
knowledge on 
advanced chemistry 
and themarkets for 




Motivation and abilities of the oil, forest and energy industries in developing the 
“SEKAB”-technology.   
Oil refinery industry Forest industry Energy industry 






• Low: SEKAB was 
created to deal 
with a by-product 
and not develop a 
new business 
opportunity.  
• Medium: Entered 









• Low: Lack of 
knowledge of 
markets for new 
fuels.  
• Low: No previous 
experience from 
chemical and fuel 
production, or 
markets.  
4 The facility as such is now used by a wide range of actors to demonstrate 
various biorefinery concepts and produce small volumes of specialised chem-
icals (Hellsmark et al., 2016a). 
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involved at all in the project. The technology could most likely have 
been adapted to their purpose, but the industry had a low interest in the 
production of bio-SNG, having very little natural gas consumption and 
no connection to any gas infrastructure. 
The energy utility in charge of the project had strong abilities in 
terms of access to biomass resources, knowledge of the FB-gasification 
process on which the Gobigas process was based, as well as knowledge 
of markets for the final product and its distribution. It also had access to 
district heating systems in which the technology could be integrated. 
However, the energy utility had very limited knowledge on the 
advanced chemistry involved in turning the gas from FB-gasification 
into bio-SNG. 
None of the incumbent actors had significant motivation or the 
abilities to really question the Swedish exemption from the CO2-tax and 
propose alternatives that were more suitable for the gas market. When 
the project was initiated, questioning the temporary exemption from the 
CO2-tax was not really considered necessary by the main actor, Göteborg 
Energi. After the financial crisis a new framework would have been 
necessary, but by then Göteborg Energy was significantly weakened by a 
growing political opposition against the project, key staff leaving the 
company, and the company withdrawing from key positions in influ-
ential interest organisations that eventually could have argued for other 
types of conditions. 
4.3. The motivation and ability of incumbents concerning distributed 
biorefineries 
Partly in parallel with the late development of the three cases above, 
efforts were also made to develop the new concept of distributed bio-
refining. The concept has its background in Case 4, Sunpine, where a 
private entrepreneur sought to develop biodiesel production using crude 
tall oil as a new resource. During the development of the project, the 
actors behind Sunpine realized that they could reduce the complexity 
and associated cost of the investment if they produced an intermediate 
product and used the refinery infrastructure at the oil refinery Preem for 
creating the final product. This first experiment could then be followed 
by additional experiments where Preem took a central position in the 
development (Case 5). 
These two cases have the following in common:  
A. They focus on less costly technologies (distillation, lignin filtration 
and pyrolysis) for creating an intermediate product than in the Cases 
1–3. This product can be upgraded to a ready-made fuel in an 
existing refinery infrastructure with capacity for hydro processing of 
oxygen rich fuels.  
B. They focus on drawing on many small sources of intermediate 
products  
C. They have successfully demonstrated new value chains that take 
advantage of existing infrastructure controlled by incumbent actors 
in mature industries.  
D. They have received relatively limited governmental funding, less 
than EUR 10 million each. 
4.3.1. Case 4: Sunpine (2006–2018) 
Crude tall oil is a dark brown, viscous and sulphur-containing liquid 
obtained in the production of pulp using the sulphate process. It contains 
significant amounts of fatty acids that can be distilled into various 
products. In the Smurfit Kappa laboratories in Piteå, an inventor- 
entrepreneur illustrated that crude tall oil could be used for the pro-
duction of biodiesel in 2006. After successful laboratory experiments, 
this know-how was transferred to the company Sunpine. Sunpine was 
further developed as a joint venture between the oil refinery Preem and 
the forestry firms Södra and Sveaskog, after the supply of crude tall oil 
was secured from P&P companies in the Piteå area during 2008. The 
purpose of the joint venture was to build a commercial-scale facility in 
the north of Sweden, using crude tall oil for producing biodiesel. The 
alliance between the inventor-entrepreneur, Preem, Södra and Sveaskog 
was formed in spite of the financial crisis and political uncertainty 
surrounding the temporary tax exemption at the time. 
Preem’s motivation to enter the joint venture was the growing 
market for renewable fuels in Sweden and Europe based on national and 
EU-legislation, providing tax incentives and mandating a high share of 
renewable fuels in the fuel mix (Table 5). Preem also identified the tall 
oil route as being significantly more attractive and legitimate than the 
use of crop-based routes, such as palm oil, as a base for their HVO- 
production. The motivation of the forest industry was mainly to get 
rid of the tall oil (which is a difficult and undesirable by-product in the 
pulp-making process, with low-value alternative uses), while capturing 
the value of the crude oil throughout the entire value chain. 
When Preem joined the project, the concept changed from the pro-
duction of regular biodiesel from tall oil to a less complex intermediate 
that could be used in Preem’s hydro processing plant, making HVO that 
can be blended 100 percent with conventional diesel. This idea of 
distributed production, creating an intermediate product at one site and 
transporting that product to a different site, simplified the production at 
Sunpine significantly. Moreover, it lowered the overall cost of the 
project, since the existing infrastructure at Preem could be used in 
combination with their know-how in making fuels that comply with 
existing standards and blending requirements. The concept of distrib-
uted production went against the basic idea behind the main in-
vestments being undertaken in Sweden for developing forest-based 
biorefineries at the time, which focused on producing a ready-made fuel 
at the same site as the biomass was refined. 
The first plant was taken into operation in 2010 (Fig. 3). Most of 
2011 was spent solving the teething problems associated with starting 
up the new process. The production was stabilized in 2012, and since 
2013 the plant has operated at higher than expected capacity, with high 
reliability. Due to the low complexity of the production, in combination 
with the possibility of using existing infrastructure, the cost of produc-
tion was reduced significantly. Although low from the start, the 
Table 4 
Motivation and abilities of the oil, forest and energy industries in developing the 
“Gobigas”-technology.   
Oil refinery industry Forest industry Energy industry 
Motivation  • Medium: Interested in 
access to bio-SNG for 
substituting natural 
gas in their hydrogen 
production.  
• Low: No 
interest in the 
gas market.  
• High: Political 
pressure to invest in 
biomass and not only 
natural gas. Bio-SNG 
gave legitimacy for 
expanding use and 
distribution of natural 
gas. 
Ability  • Medium: Relevant 
technology suppliers 
could support the 
project.  
• Low: Little 
knowledge of 
gas markets.  
• High: Significant 
experience with FB- 
gasification and gas 
markets  
• Low: No experience 
with advanced 
chemistry for bio-SNG 
production.  
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profitability of the plant could be secured without any additional in-
vestment or market support from policy. 
The yield of intermediate biodiesel product at the start of the pro-
duction was about 60 percent, which may seem low. The low yield also 
implies that the crude tall oil contains other substances that have 
alternative usages. In order to increase the yield of valuable products, 
Sunpine started to develop processes for extraction of rosin chemicals 
from the crude tall oil in collaboration with a Japanese pine chemicals 
company, Harima Chemicals, and its daughter company Lawter (Fig. 3). 
Lawter and Sunpine agreed to realize the rosin investment project and 
Lawter was included as a new partner in the Sunpine consortium in 
2015. The effort resulted in an increase in yield to over 70%, with sig-
nificant impact on overall profitability without any policy support. As a 
next step, Sunpine then started to extract turpentine from tall oil (Fig. 3). 
Turpentine is used for manufacturing many different products including 
paint, lacquers and perfume. The turpentine production at Sunpine is 
around 3000 tons per annum, compared to 25,000 tons of rosin and over 
90,000 tons of tall oil diesel. These measures have had a strong and 
positive impact on Sunpine’s financial results, but also on the motivation 
of the actors involved to further develop the process.5 
With the development of Sunpine, the motivation and abilities of 
both Preem and the forest industry to develop the concept of distributed 
biorefining increased significantly. With a relatively small investment, 
they had managed to establish a profitable business that in the case of 
Preem could be used to develop their existing infrastructure. 
However, crude tall oil is a very limited raw material compared to 
fossil oil. It will not be possible to increase the Swedish production much 
more and there may not be much more than 2.5 Mtonnes of crude tall oil 
available on a global basis. As a result, stakeholders like Preem, Sveas-
kog, Södra and a wide range of other firms have started to look for and 
develop other similar resources. Following in the footsteps of Sunpine, 
the goal of these stakeholders is to scale up the current concept of 
“distributed biorefining” in which the infrastructure at oil refineries is 
taken advantage of in combination with local facilities for production of 
intermediate products (such as lignin, pyrolysis or other oils from hy-
drothermal liquefaction, as well as Fischer-Tropsch waxes). 
4.3.2. Case 5: Preem (2015–2018) 
Leading up to 2018, the main barrier to the scaling up of domestic 
forest-based biofuel production was still the temporary exemption from 
CO2-taxes that had to be approved by the EU every year or every second 
year. Although the Sunpine investment had been successful, the tax 
exemption did not create the necessary incentives to speed up the 
implementation of forest-based alternatives for transport fuels, since 
investment security was not created for more than 2 years at a time, 
while the payback time for the necessary investments were typically in 
the range of 10–15 years. 
As a relatively small oil refinery in Northern Europe, with no control 
over crude oil resources, and operating on what from a climate 
perspective would become a declining market, Preem identified devel-
oping forest-based biomass resources to be strategically important for 
staying competitive in the long run. Given that favourable market con-
ditions for biofuels could be created, Preem thought that they could 
potentially turn a global competitive disadvantage into an advantage, 
being a relatively small scale and flexible refinery with good connections 
to the forest industry and national political decision-makers. However, 
for making the business case, it was considered important that: firstly, 
the biofuels they would develop were not directly exposed to a fluctu-
ating oil price; secondly, that they would be promoted in relation to their 
CO2-reduction potential; and thirdly, that the fuels would be considered 
legitimate in the eyes of the public. 
Preem took the lead in suggesting an alternative to the temporary tax 
exemption. They were soon joined by other leading industry represen-
tatives and the Swedish Biomass Association, who also identified that a 
change was necessary. With slight variations, the industry soon settled 
Fig. 3. Initial version of a distributed biorefinery where crude tall oil is pro-
cessed at Sunpine, and then shipped to the refinery Preem for final upgrading. 
The biodiesel production has also enabled the production of Rosin and Tur-
pentine, increasing the overall yield and profitability of the plant. 
Table 5 
Motivation and abilities of the oil, forest and energy industries in developing the “Sunpine”-technology.   
Oil refinery industry Forest industry Energy 
industry 
Motivation High:  
• Growing market for biofuels within EU and Sweden.  
• Tall oil presented a more environmentally friendly 
alternative than palm oil.  
• Good fit with their existing infrastructure.  
• Relatively low investment cost compared to 
previous experiments. 
High  
• Alternative use of by-product, crude tall oil.  
• No need to go to final product and enter a market they did not know, but at the same time 




Ability High:  
• Good fit with existing infrastructure.  
• Investments allowed Preem to further develop 
abilities related to their existing infrastructure. 
High:  
• No need to venture outside existing abilities. 
Not 
applicable  
5 However, the primary investment would not have taken place without 
being able to prove that the production could reach profitability based on the 
main product, biodiesel, regardless of the potential profitability of future by- 
products. 
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for promoting a “reduction quota” to replace the tax break. In parallel, 
the Swedish Energy Agency was tasked by the government in 2016 to 
investigate and propose an alternative to the existing tax exemption 
(Energimyndigheten, 2016). The investigation also suggested a reduc-
tion quota, which would give extra incentives to develop biofuels that 
could provide the highest reduction of greenhouse gas emissions at the 
lowest possible cost. In 2017, the Swedish Government announced that 
the reduction quota would come into effect by July 1st, 2018. Emission 
reduction levels were specified for the years 2018–2020 and an indic-
ative reduction was set to 40% by 2030 (Miljö- och ener-
gidepartementet, 2017b). 
With the new incentive structure in place, Preem has increased their 
ambitions to produce biofuels from 200,000 m3 to 3 million m3 by 2030. 
It has also spurred significant entrepreneurial activities in the field that 
potentially could deliver towards the new goal of Preem and Sweden’s 
ambitions to significantly reduce the domestic emissions from the 
transport sector (see Fig. 4). 
Two of the initiatives, Suncarbon and Renfuel, focused on various 
types of techniques for separating out lignin from black liquor and then 
converting the lignin through enzymatic and/or catalytic treatment to a 
biooil that can be shipped and upgraded at refinery through hydrogen 
treatment. The technology is still in early development, but in May 
2018, Renfuel entered a joint venture with Preem with the purpose of 
building the first commercial-scale plant in collaboration with the P&P 
firm Rottneros (Renfuel, 2018). 
The technology allows for separating the lignin from the black liquor 
and thus offloading the recovery boiler at the mill. This allows for 
increasing the capacity at the mill without making new and expensive 
investments in the recovery boiler. Hence, through a smaller investment 
in lignin separation for creating a lignin oil, Rottneros could postpone or 
avoid major investment in a new recovery boiler, while at the same time 
making a profit from the lignin oil. The situation was described as a 
“win-win situation” by Preem, while Rottneros was less certain of the 
benefits of the collaboration. In mid-2019 Rottneros decided to with-
draw from the collaboration, citing lack of clarity on future profit 
sharing as one of the main reasons (Table 6).6 
Besides the collaborations mentioned above with the large P&P in-
dustries, there are three interesting ventures going in different but 
complementary directions. The first two are larger sawmills in Sweden 
and Norway that have divested into the biofuel business, using sawdust 
as the feedstock for producing biofuels (Setra and Biozin). Setra, for 
example, has entered a technology cooperation with a European tech-
nology supplier who has been performing tests with sawdust from Setras 
sawmill in Gävle. In total 6 tons of biooil have been produced and the 
end product has been evaluated with good results by Preem. In June 
2017, Setra were granted approximately EUR 11.5 million, covering 45 
percent of the budgeted investment costs, to construct a commercial- 
scale facility. An investment decision has been taken and start of pro-
duction is projected for 2021. The final example is the Finnish con-
sortium that consists of the Finnish utility Fortum and technology 
supplier Valmet that has signed an agreement with Preem to explore the 
possibility of processing the biooil being produced in their commercial- 
scale pyrolysis unit in Joensuu, currently producing approximately 50 
ktons of biooil annually (Preem, 2018). 
The prospect of supplying various types of forest-based biooils that 
can be upgraded in a refinery infrastructure is therefore well under way. 
However, processing organic biooils requires that the refinery makes 
investment in renewable hydrogen production. Preem is also pursuing 
such a project, where they collaborate with the state-owned electrical 
utility Vattenfall in order to produce renewable hydrogen from 
electricity. 
In this final case, Preem’s motivation and ability to pursue the 
distributed biorefinery concept has increased even further. To begin 
with, successful interaction with policy has resulted in the development 
and implementation of the reduction quota, which gives a clear benefit 
to fuels with the highest possible CO2-performance. It also paves the 
wave for smaller investments in the forest industry in which smaller 
volumes of biooil can be produced. 
In terms of the forest industry, the motivation and abilities have also 
increased as the distributed concept has reduced the complexity and risk 
of investing. With small investments to off-load the recovery boiler, the 
forest industry avoids the large investments in new boilers, while also 
making an additional income on the lignin without having to go all the 
way to fuel production. The smaller investment also enables the forest 
industry to stepwise develop new capabilities and abilities in relation to 
converting lignin to new products without venturing into the fuel mar-
ket. There are still challenges with regard to sharing profits between the 
forest and oil industry, however, where the forest industry is not inter-
ested in “just” supplying a resource to the oil industry but rather in 
sharing revenues created throughout the value chain. In distributed 
biorefinering a key challenge is to find collaborative model between the 
oil and forest industry where the value of the products is shared 
throughout the value chain. The energy industry faces a similar situation 
to the forest industry, as the distributed concept allows them to integrate 
new technology into existing operations in a stepwise manner. To date, 
practical experience has been very limited, and it appears as if the in-
dustry is significantly less motivated compared to the forest industry, 
which has their recovery boilers to off-load and does not experience any 
additional pressure from stakeholders or owners. 
5. Discussion 
As set out in the introduction, the aim of the current paper has been 
two-fold. Firstly, we have aimed to arrive at a more detailed under-
standing of when and how incumbent actors may drive energy transi-
tions. Secondly, we have aimed to illustrate the policy related trade-offs 
between policy approaches that actively seek to involve incumbents in 
sustainable transitions, and policy approaches that try to pursue such 
transitions without their active involvement. 
In this paper we have illustrated how this detailed understanding of 
when and how incumbents may drive energy transitions requires spe-
cific attention to the motivation and ability of incumbents to engage in 
transition processes. By analysing the motivation and abilities of in-
cumbents from three mature industries (oil refinery, forest and energy) 
we are able to conclude that significant policy efforts in Sweden have 
been directed towards creating a forest-based bioeconomy. The main 
target of these government investments has been start-ups and 
university-based concepts, which in turn have been geared towards 
large-scale biorefineries with a rather complex integration with the 
infrastructure of mature industries, mainly in the forest and energy 
sectors. 
The underlying logic behind these government interventions has a 
science-push perspective, where the state is an important sponsor of 
basic and applied research, while upscaling and commercialisation of 
the developed technologies is to a large extent left to the market. The 
developed concepts have thus been dependent on the active participa-
tion of primarily incumbent actors from the forest and energy industries, 
but overall these have shown both low motivation and abilities to 
actively participate in creating the necessary pre-conditions for scaling 
up of the demonstrated concepts (Table 7). 
Although previous research has shown that incumbent actors in the 
pulp and paper industry are capable of engaging in both exploration and 
exploitation (Onufrey and Bergek, 2019), that is not an explanation for 
6 Another similar initiative is by SCA, a P&P company, venturing into bio-
refining and biofuel production. This example is slightly different, as SCA has 
not decided on a distributed production of biofuels and if they will cooperate 
with Preem or some other refinery. A key issue for formulating such a collab-
oration has been to find an agreement where they do not “just” supply a 
resource to an oil refinery but rather share revenues created throughout the 
value chain. 
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their absence from the development of future biorefineries. Instead, we 
argue in this paper that this absence should rather be attributed to the 
starting point of policymaking being focused on pilots and demonstra-
tion of the new technologies. A complementing focus would have 
included the existing infrastructures, competencies and the underlying 
motives of incumbent actors, as well as the policy and market conditions 
for the products coming out of the demonstrations. We argue that this is 
of particular importance in the biorefinery case, since reducing costs and 
complexity for existing concepts hinges on successful integration into 
existing infrastructures and the development of complementary 
products. 
Although a collaborative model of innovation was attempted in Case 
1–3 (but failed), there has not been any direct efforts by policy to in-
crease the motivation and abilities of the incumbent actors to participate 
in the experiments. Consequently, when incumbent actors have 
encountered challenges, they have chosen to withdraw from the projects 
and left it to start-ups and universities to continue the development. The 
remaining actors have mainly focused on technology development, 
without deeper considerations for – or possibilities for influencing – the 
broader policy context, including demand-side policies (Hellsmark 
et al., 2016b). 
It was not until a rather small joint investment by one of the 
incumbent oil refineries and representatives from the forest industry in 
Sweden happened that a better alignment between motivation and 
ability could be achieved (Case 4). The investment in Sunpine 
strengthened primarily Preem’s motivation and ability to take the next 
step, creating significant motivation for aligning the institutional setting 
to their new and strategic objectives of significantly increasing their 
biofuel production from forest-based biomass. With these efforts the 
market appears to have been “tilted” towards distributed biorefining, 
rather than creating opportunities for standalone production that would 
have been pursued outside the control of the refinery industry. 
This points to the fact that incumbent participation depends on the 
formation of markets, stable political conditions and their ability to 
utilize existing infrastructure for realising these markets (Bergek et al., 
2013). The engagement of the oil refinery industry also meant that the 
complexity of realising future biorefineries was significantly reduced 
compared to previous concepts. The need for new infrastructure and big 
investments could be reduced by introducing a “distributed biorefinery 
principle”, in which small-scale investments in existing sawmills, P&P 
Fig. 4. Examples of significant initiatives that could deliver towards Preem’s and national targets through a “distributed” biorefinery concept.  
Table 6 
Motivation and abilities of the oil, forest and energy industries in developing distributed biorefining.   
Oil refinery industry Forest industry Energy industrya 
Motivation  • High: The profitability of Sunpine exceeded 
expectations as efficiency could be increased 
and new products added.  
• High: Operating on a declining fossil fuel 
market.  
• High: Lowered the risk by reducing cost and 
process complexity.  
• High: With small investments to off-load the recovery boiler the 
forest industry avoided large investments in new boilers while also 
making an additional income on the lignin without having to go all 
the way to fuel production.  
• High: Did not disrupt or interfere with existing production.  
• Low: No pressure to be part of the 
technology development from 
stakeholder or owners 
Ability  • High: Mades use of and expanded abilities 
associated with existing infrastructure.  
• High: Good fit with existing infrastructure.  
• High: Enabled the forest industry to stepwise develop new 
capabilities and abilities in relation to converting lignin to new 
products without venturing into the fuel market.  
• High: Good fit with existing 
infrastructure and competencies  
a In principle, this distributed concept could be relevant for energy utilities and district heating companies as well, but apart from the Fortum investment the existing 
actors have shown very little interest in the technology. 
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mills, district heating etc., could be combined with the infrastructure of 
existing oil refineries for producing bio-based fuels, chemicals and ma-
terials. In a joint effort the incumbent actors from the two mature sectors 
were able to influence the institutional setting, creating more favourable 
conditions for a future scale up of distributed concepts. A key factor for 
joining forces and for successful collaboration was the profit-sharing 
scheme that enabled both incumbent actors from the forestry and oil 
refinery industries to profit from joint development throughout the 
value chain. Hence, when the collaboration could depart from the assets 
and resources of the existing industry this allowed pushing technology 
development, developing a favourable policy and a market context. 
We noted in the introduction that previous research on incumbency 
has failed to consider how policy-related trade-offs arise, depending on 
the actors who take the lead and set the agenda in the transition pro-
cesses. To begin with we would like to argue that while the shift towards 
“distributed biorefining” has opened up for the production of advanced 
biofuels and materials, it has also opened up for further investments and 
continued used of the fossil infrastructure. 
If the earlier and more complex investments would have been real-
ized (Case 1–3, Fig. 1), this would have opened up for an “on-site” 
production of fuels and chemicals in connection with the forest industry 
and energy sector. The unintentional consequence would have been that 
the oil industry would have played a smaller or insignificant role in the 
development of future biorefineries. Hence, with the introduction of 
distributed biorefining, the oil refinery industry is also included in the 
future development. Revenues from biofuels can also be used to revi-
talize the industry, which otherwise would be operating in a declining 
market, facing smaller margins and increased competition, making it 
more and more difficult to make investments in existing infrastructure. 
With this shift towards distributed biorefining, we can discern a new 
dawn for the oil industry within the bioeconomy, which also includes 
possibilities to invest in the fossil part of the refinery infrastructure. For 
example, in parallel with the investments in biorefining, Preem has 
applied for a permit to make necessary investments for upgrading low- 
grade bunker oil to gasoline and diesel on an annual basis. This is an 
investment that would increase the emissions from their current facility 
in Lysekil from 1.7 to 2.7 million ton CO2 per year (Gustafsson and 
Johansson, 2019). 
Furthermore, a starting point in the infrastructures, competencies 
and motivations of incumbents may also narrow the area of search for 
new technologies and impose limits on the radical nature of the solu-
tions developed. At the same time, our analysis indicates the potential 
advantages, in terms of significantly lower investment needs, and 
greater chances of actually achieving commercialisation of new tech-
nologies, starting by considering the challenges of the industries and the 
possibilities for utilising available resources. 
Consequently, we suggest that policymakers acknowledge the policy 
trade-offs between the different policy approaches when prioritising 
resources for stimulating sustainability transitions. It might be that 
neither a policy portfolio fully targeted towards the development of new 
technologies free from the interests of incumbent actors, nor a policy 
portfolio that consistently takes a starting point in the motivations and 
abilities of incumbents is suitable for achieving sustainability transi-
tions. This suggests that transformative innovation policy should give 
more attention to considering how policy mixes may support the reor-
ientation of incumbents rather than predominantly focusing on mar-
ginalising and replacing incumbents. 
6. Conclusion and policy implications 
The paper aims, firstly, to arrive at a more detailed understanding of 
when incumbents may drive energy transitions and, secondly, to illus-
trate the policy-related trade-offs between policy approaches that 
actively seek to involve incumbents in energy transitions and policy 
approaches that try to pursue such transitions without their active 
involvement. 
In relation to the first aim, our analysis supports the conclusion that 
incumbents will only drive transitions when both their motivation and 
ability for doing so are high. Contrary to earlier experiments with large- 
scale biorefineries that failed to engage incumbent actors from mature 
industries, recent cases of distributed refineries bring together in-
cumbents from the oil refinery and forest industries, which are highly 
motivated and able to utilize their abilities. Thus, without the active 
participation of incumbent actors and the resources they possess, 
including key infrastructure, future biorefineries and the production of 
forest-based renewable transportation fuels has not been realized. Public 
funding in forest biorefineries was only successful when an actor from 
the oil industry entered the scene and enabled distributed biorefining. 
The introduction of distributed biorefining has enabled the use of the 
infrastructure in both the oil refinery and forestry infrastructure and has 
aligned the motivation and ability of incumbents from these industries. 
However, a profit-sharing model between incumbents in the forest and 
oil industries continues to be a key challenge for future development. 
Distributed biorefining has also turned the future development of bio-
refineries into a core activity for the oil industry, which has allocated 
resources to market and policy development. In Sweden, this has 
resulted in a policy framework that is well aligned with the concept of 
distributed biorefining. 
Regarding the second aim, our analysis and discussion clearly 
highlights the existence of trade-offs when policy actively seeks to 
involve incumbents in energy transitions. On the one hand, the active 
participation of the oil industry creates new opportunities within the 
bioeconomy and may contribute to meeting ambitious national climate 
targets. However, on the other hand, the active participation of the oil 
industry also opens up for future investments in the fossil-based infra-
structure. To which extent these investments prolong the carbon lock-in 
Table 7 
Incumbent actors from mature industries and their motivation and abilities to drive the development of bio-refining.  
Incumbentactors from the … Motivation/Ability Case 1: 
Chemrec 
Case 2: SEKAB Case 3: Gobigas Case 4: Sunpine Case 5: 
Preem 
… oil refinery industry Motivation Low Low Medium High High 
Ability High Low Medium High High 
… forest industry Motivation Low Low Low High High 
Ability Low Low Low High High 
… energy industry Motivation NA Medium High NA Low 
Ability NA Low High/Low NA High  
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and become an active obstacle in the transition to a bioeconomy is too 
early to say. The alternative, in which the biorefinery development 
would have been centred on the forest and energy industry, would have 
required a much more proactive policy approach. The focus of such an 
approach would have been on policy and market development and 
activation of key incumbent actors in the forestry and energy industry to 
take responsibility for the entire value chain. That would have required 
the development of a whole new set of competencies in advanced 
chemistry, fuels synthesis etc. 
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Appendix. List of interviewees  
# Date Interview Affiliation Case 
1 2007-03-01 Project leader Göteborg Energi Gobigas 
2 2008-01-16 Project leader Göteborg Energi Gobigas 
3 2008-12-01 Technical Director Kappa Chemrec 
4 2008-12-02 Senior researcher LTU Chemrec 
5 2008-12-03 CEO Chemrec Chemrec 
6 2008-12-04 Senior researcher Umeå University SEKAB/Chemrec 
7 2008-12-12 Project manager Volvo Chemrec 
8 2009-01-07 Technical Director Volvo Chemrec 
9 2009-01-08 Deputy Director General Energimyndigheten Chemrec 
10 2009-01-15 Technical expert Preem Chemrec 
11 2009-03-20 Senior researcher Chalmers Gobigas 
12 2009-04-08 CEO Göteborg Energi Gobigas 
13 2012-02-22 Project leader Gobigas Gobigas 
14 2012-09-28 Senior researcher Chalmers Gobigas 
15 2012-10-12 Technical Director EON Gobigas 
16 2013-05-08 Senior researcher LTU Chemrec 
17 2013-05-13 Technical Director Domsjö Fabriker/Aditya Birla SEKAB/Chemrec 
18 2013-05-13 Director Processum SEKAB 
19 2013-05-13 VP SEKAB SEKAB 
20 2013-05-13 Senior research advisor RISE SEKAB 
21 2013-08-16 Area manager RISE SEKAB 
22 2013-08-23 Technical Director SEKAB SEKAB 
23 2013-08-23 VP SEKAB E-technology SEKAB 
24 2013-08-26 Project manager Domsjö Fabriker/Aditya Birla SEKAB/Chemrec 
25 2013-08-26 CEO MORE Research SEKAB 
26 2013-08-26 Director Processum SEKAB 
27 2013-08-26 Senior research advisor RISE SEKAB 
28 2013-08-27 Senior researcher Umeå University SEKAB/Chemrec 
29 2013-08-28 Senior researcher Umeå University SEKAB 
30 2013-09-27 Principal LTU Chemrec 
31 2015-06-11 Director ETC Chemrec 
32 2015-07-08 Project manager Göteborg Energi Gobigas 
33 2015-09-09 Project manager Gobigas Gobigas 
34 2015-09-10 Senior researcher Chalmers Gobigas 
35 2015-09-22 Senior research advisor RISE SEKAB 
36 2015-10-02 Project leader LTU Green Fuels Chemrec 
37 2015-10-08 Project leader Gobigas Gobigas 
38 2015-10-13 Technical Director SEKAB SEKAB 
39 2016-02-09 Senior Officer Energimyndigheten All plants 
40 2018-02-19 Senior researcher Renfuel Preem 
41 2018-02-19 Technical expert Preem Preem/Sunpine 
42 2018-02-27 CEO Kiram Preem/Sunpine 
43 2018-03-07 Project leader Preem Preem 
44 2018-04-14 Technical Director Setra Preem  
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bensin och diesel. Eskilstuna. ER 2016: 30. http://epi6.energimyndigheten.se/Page 
Files/54532/Styrmedel%20för%20ökad%20användning%20av%20biodrivmedel% 
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Karltorp, K., Sandén, B.A., 2012. Explaining regime destabilisation in the pulp and paper 
industry. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 2, 66–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
eist.2011.12.001. 
Kivimaa, P., Kern, F., 2016. Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation 
policy mixes for sustainability transitions. Res. Pol. 45, 205–217. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.008. 
Klitkou, A., Bolwig, S., Hansen, T., Wessberg, N., 2015. The role of lock-in mechanisms in 
transition processes: the case of energy for road transport. Environ. Innov. Soc. 
Trans. 16, 22–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EIST.2015.07.005. 
Kungl, G., Geels, F.W., 2018. Sequence and alignment of external pressures in industry 
destabilisation: understanding the downfall of incumbent utilities in the German 
energy transition (1998–2015). Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 26, 78–100. https://doi. 
org/10.1016/j.eist.2017.05.003. 
Langley, A., Tsoukas, H., Smallman, C., van de Ven, A.H., 2013. Process studies of change 
in organization and management: unveiling temporality, activity, and flow. Acad. 
Manag. J. 56, 1–13. 
Lee, D., Hess, D.J., 2019. Incumbent resistance and the solar transition: changing 
opportunity structures and framing strategies. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 33, 
183–195. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2019.05.005. 
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